1 00:00:01,620 --> 00:00:03,965 Beatours 28, you are clear for takeoff. 2 00:00:13,689 --> 00:00:15,517 Eighty knots. 3 00:00:17,689 --> 00:00:19,517 Stop! 4 00:00:20,379 --> 00:00:22,655 Don't hammer the brakes. Don't hammer the brakes. 5 00:00:22,724 --> 00:00:27,068 137 people are on board this British Airtours flight. 6 00:00:27,137 --> 00:00:29,793 Within minutes, nearly half of them will be dead. 7 00:00:29,862 --> 00:00:32,137 This should not really have happened. 8 00:00:32,344 --> 00:00:34,034 Evacuate, evacuate! 9 00:00:34,103 --> 00:00:36,034 The aircraft didn't even get airborne. 10 00:00:36,103 --> 00:00:38,310 It didn't run off the runway. 11 00:00:38,379 --> 00:00:40,758 And yet, still, 55 people were killed. 12 00:00:41,310 --> 00:00:44,379 For investigators, it's a familiar routine: 13 00:00:44,448 --> 00:00:47,689 Reconstructing the final moments inside the cabin, 14 00:00:47,758 --> 00:00:50,517 analyzing the wreckage and the flight-data recorders. 15 00:00:51,655 --> 00:00:53,551 In the end, they turn to a psychologist 16 00:00:53,620 --> 00:00:56,275 to help them figure out how a survivable emergency 17 00:00:56,344 --> 00:01:00,000 turned into one of British aviation's most horrific disasters. 18 00:01:03,275 --> 00:01:05,206 Mayday, mayday. 19 00:01:28,620 --> 00:01:33,137 It's just before 6:00 in the morning on August the 22nd, 1985. 20 00:01:35,103 --> 00:01:37,034 Manchester's airport is coming to life. 21 00:01:39,034 --> 00:01:42,310 The first flights of the day are being prepped for departure. 22 00:01:46,068 --> 00:01:50,034 British Airtours Flight 28 is scheduled to take 131 passengers 23 00:01:50,103 --> 00:01:53,172 from Manchester to the Greek Island of Corfu. 24 00:01:56,689 --> 00:01:59,931 British Airtours is a division of British Airways, 25 00:02:00,000 --> 00:02:03,103 specializing in low-cost flights to vacation destinations. 26 00:02:06,413 --> 00:02:08,344 It's a chilly morning. 27 00:02:08,413 --> 00:02:11,413 A slight breeze is blowing. Ideal flying weather. 28 00:02:18,137 --> 00:02:21,068 Most of the passengers on this early-morning flight are travelling on vacation. 29 00:02:26,689 --> 00:02:30,586 Lindsay Davies is heading to Greece with her boyfriend, Charlie Thickson. 30 00:02:30,655 --> 00:02:32,379 Alright, let's go. 31 00:02:32,448 --> 00:02:35,655 We'd been going out with each other for a year, 32 00:02:35,724 --> 00:02:39,689 and that's one of the reasons we were so excited about it. 33 00:02:39,758 --> 00:02:41,620 You know, it was our first holiday together. 34 00:02:43,344 --> 00:02:45,689 Captain Peter Terrington is in command. 35 00:02:46,517 --> 00:02:49,896 I was the senior training captain on the fleet. 36 00:02:49,965 --> 00:02:53,724 First Officer Brian Love is being trained by Terrington. 37 00:02:53,793 --> 00:02:56,793 He was going to perform a takeoff and landing... 38 00:02:58,000 --> 00:02:59,758 ...as part of his training. 39 00:03:00,448 --> 00:03:02,310 - Alright, Captain? - Yep. 40 00:03:02,379 --> 00:03:05,344 Uh, briefing then, Brian. Airfield emergencies. 41 00:03:05,413 --> 00:03:06,827 You handling the aircraft. - Mm-hmm. 42 00:03:06,896 --> 00:03:09,758 - What are the four things you're gonna stop for? - Fire, failure, 43 00:03:09,827 --> 00:03:12,206 configuration warning, or you shouting stop. - Okay. 44 00:03:12,275 --> 00:03:14,931 So you bring the thing to a stop and I'll take over the aircraft 45 00:03:15,000 --> 00:03:18,172 and leave you to deal with the emergency. I'll deal with the ATC. Okay? 46 00:03:20,206 --> 00:03:23,310 If you've talked about the possibility of emergency 47 00:03:23,379 --> 00:03:27,241 and talked over what you will do, then if it actually happens, 48 00:03:27,310 --> 00:03:30,275 it's easier to recall those... items. 49 00:03:30,344 --> 00:03:31,965 Okay, Brian, start 2. 50 00:03:32,034 --> 00:03:33,034 Starting 2. 51 00:03:35,275 --> 00:03:37,517 Oil pressure rising. - Okay, go on. 52 00:03:38,586 --> 00:03:40,413 Twenty-four, 25, 26, 53 00:03:40,482 --> 00:03:42,862 27, 28, 29. 54 00:03:45,655 --> 00:03:47,448 One-twenty-nine plus two on board, Captain. 55 00:03:47,517 --> 00:03:49,724 All strapped in. Doors are closed and automatic. 56 00:03:49,793 --> 00:03:51,310 Thank you, Arthur. 57 00:03:52,137 --> 00:03:54,827 The crew is flying a Boeing 737. 58 00:04:05,827 --> 00:04:08,000 It takes just four minutes 59 00:04:08,068 --> 00:04:10,965 for the plane to reach the foot of the runway. 60 00:04:11,551 --> 00:04:13,724 Beatours 28, you are clear for takeoff. 61 00:04:15,000 --> 00:04:19,241 The 737 has 3,000 metres to get to takeoff speed. 62 00:04:21,965 --> 00:04:24,000 The engines are pushed to high power. 63 00:04:28,103 --> 00:04:31,137 I was sitting by the window, looking out of the window. 64 00:04:31,206 --> 00:04:33,862 Everything was normal. The plane was going quite fast. 65 00:04:36,034 --> 00:04:38,275 - Eighty knots. - Check. 66 00:04:44,413 --> 00:04:45,965 Oh, my God. 67 00:04:46,034 --> 00:04:48,034 We heard a dull thud, 68 00:04:48,103 --> 00:04:50,793 which sounded as if it came from outside. 69 00:04:53,793 --> 00:04:58,172 I was really keen to see what was going on outside, but couldn't see anything. 70 00:04:58,241 --> 00:05:00,965 Captain Terrington needs to act fast. 71 00:05:01,034 --> 00:05:03,655 Stop! 72 00:05:09,965 --> 00:05:13,275 And... the immediate reaction was to stop. 73 00:05:13,344 --> 00:05:16,896 We were quite a few knots below our decision speed, 74 00:05:16,965 --> 00:05:20,379 so I very quickly closed the throttles and... 75 00:05:20,448 --> 00:05:22,103 applied reverse thrust. 76 00:05:22,172 --> 00:05:24,896 We could feel the aircraft slowing down, 77 00:05:24,965 --> 00:05:29,758 and I thought we'd blown a tire, and I didn't know, so... 78 00:05:29,827 --> 00:05:31,517 we just waited to hear. 79 00:05:34,724 --> 00:05:37,862 Don't hammer the brakes. Don't hammer the brakes. 80 00:05:42,275 --> 00:05:44,620 I thought the tire might've gone, 81 00:05:44,689 --> 00:05:48,896 and would cause damage to the undercarriage if we braked too strongly. 82 00:05:48,965 --> 00:05:51,620 Probably nothing. I wouldn't worry. 83 00:05:53,068 --> 00:05:55,310 I just assumed that maybe a tire had burst, 84 00:05:55,379 --> 00:05:57,724 so I wasn't really alarmed at that point. 85 00:05:57,793 --> 00:05:59,758 My thought at that time was: Oh, okay, 86 00:05:59,827 --> 00:06:02,517 we're gonna get off this plane and probably... 87 00:06:02,586 --> 00:06:05,689 have to move all the luggage onto another plane and take off. 88 00:06:11,103 --> 00:06:15,310 Soon, passengers on the left side of the plane see the real problem. 89 00:06:19,034 --> 00:06:22,551 I could see orange flames inside the back of the engine. 90 00:06:23,689 --> 00:06:25,482 And at that point, I thought: 91 00:06:25,551 --> 00:06:28,344 It's obviously not a burst tire. 92 00:06:28,413 --> 00:06:31,862 That wouldn't cause that. And this is perhaps something a bit more serious. 93 00:06:34,206 --> 00:06:36,827 Let me by. I'm not staying there. 94 00:06:36,896 --> 00:06:40,344 But at that point, I knew that I wanted to get off the plane, 95 00:06:40,413 --> 00:06:42,379 and I wasn't happy at all. 96 00:06:43,344 --> 00:06:45,482 I knew that there was a fire, 97 00:06:45,551 --> 00:06:48,206 and I just wanted to get away from the fire. 98 00:06:48,275 --> 00:06:50,793 Smoke is seeping into the cabin. 99 00:06:50,862 --> 00:06:53,620 - Please sit down. - My nearest exit was at the back. 100 00:06:53,689 --> 00:06:57,241 I didn't want to go to the back because the smoke was coming in there. 101 00:06:57,310 --> 00:07:01,000 So I decided in my mind that I was gonna go through the front. 102 00:07:01,068 --> 00:07:03,379 I said to Charlie: Come on, we're going! 103 00:07:03,448 --> 00:07:06,620 And that's when I started going towards the front of the plane. 104 00:07:09,137 --> 00:07:11,517 Stopping. 28 Mike, we're abandoning takeoff. 105 00:07:13,896 --> 00:07:16,827 Looks like we've got a fire on 106 00:07:18,793 --> 00:07:21,586 - Looks like there's a lot of fire. - Thank you. 107 00:07:21,655 --> 00:07:24,172 Plane on fire, runway 24. 108 00:07:24,241 --> 00:07:26,241 From where he's sitting, 109 00:07:26,310 --> 00:07:30,586 Captain Terrington can't see how bad the fire is. He needs advice from the tower. 110 00:07:30,655 --> 00:07:33,241 Do we have to get the passengers off? 111 00:07:33,310 --> 00:07:35,241 I would do, by the starboard side. 112 00:07:36,241 --> 00:07:38,586 Terrington decides to pull off the runway. 113 00:07:41,172 --> 00:07:43,724 Evacuate to the starboard side, please. 114 00:07:50,448 --> 00:07:52,241 Fire drill, engine 115 00:07:52,310 --> 00:07:54,206 Shutting down 2. 116 00:07:54,275 --> 00:07:57,241 Evacuate! Evacuate! Please stay calm. 117 00:07:58,137 --> 00:08:00,310 Before the flight crew leaves the cockpit, 118 00:08:00,379 --> 00:08:02,586 they must complete a 15-step checklist. 119 00:08:04,551 --> 00:08:06,413 - Parking brake. - Set. 120 00:08:06,482 --> 00:08:08,310 - Speed-brake lever. - Down. 121 00:08:08,379 --> 00:08:10,379 But time is running out. 122 00:08:10,862 --> 00:08:13,482 We had, uh, an evacuation checklist, 123 00:08:13,551 --> 00:08:15,655 but it was four pages long, 124 00:08:15,724 --> 00:08:18,275 and the last item was to get the passengers off. 125 00:08:18,344 --> 00:08:20,103 Engine and APU fire-warning switches. 126 00:08:20,172 --> 00:08:23,724 This didn't cover my... problem at all. 127 00:08:24,517 --> 00:08:27,586 On the 737, there are four cabin doors. 128 00:08:28,896 --> 00:08:32,000 The two in the back are covered in flames and smoke, 129 00:08:32,068 --> 00:08:34,931 leaving only two for 137 people. 130 00:08:37,068 --> 00:08:40,724 Then a mechanical problem eliminates one of those. 131 00:08:42,827 --> 00:08:45,241 Well, Arthur was opening one right. 132 00:08:45,310 --> 00:08:49,827 And he was really banging, he was really trying to open it; it was really hard to open. 133 00:08:54,482 --> 00:08:56,896 The back of the cabin is filling with smoke. 134 00:08:58,655 --> 00:09:00,965 It's making breathing difficult. 135 00:09:01,034 --> 00:09:03,758 Passengers rush forward. 136 00:09:03,827 --> 00:09:07,896 It just seemed to go on forever before they started evacuating. 137 00:09:08,896 --> 00:09:11,551 And that's when I thought: I'm not gonna get off. 138 00:09:11,620 --> 00:09:13,827 It's gonna blow up with all of us on it. 139 00:09:13,896 --> 00:09:16,689 Engine and APU fire-warning switches. 140 00:09:16,758 --> 00:09:21,137 Right now, all 137 people on board are alive. 141 00:09:22,344 --> 00:09:25,137 But with every second, their odds of surviving are decreasing. 142 00:09:27,310 --> 00:09:28,689 Flight 28... 143 00:09:29,724 --> 00:09:31,344 ...is becoming a death trap. 144 00:09:42,758 --> 00:09:45,793 The jammed door on the right side of British Airtours Flight 28 145 00:09:45,862 --> 00:09:47,827 leaves the crew no choice. 146 00:09:50,137 --> 00:09:53,724 They must get the passengers out from the side of the plane that's burning. 147 00:09:59,275 --> 00:10:03,068 As soon as we opened the door, the fire service were already arrived, 148 00:10:03,137 --> 00:10:06,965 shooting foam up the slide; it came into the galley floor. 149 00:10:10,068 --> 00:10:12,655 We wanted to start evacuating passengers, but... 150 00:10:12,724 --> 00:10:15,448 there was a bit of a bottleneck and nobody was coming forward. 151 00:10:15,517 --> 00:10:18,517 The aisle is quite narrow where the galley is, 152 00:10:18,586 --> 00:10:20,689 and they were pushing forward. 153 00:10:20,758 --> 00:10:26,034 And I could see this boy that was really sort of pushed against the wall. 154 00:10:30,068 --> 00:10:33,896 He couldn't get out, so I pulled him by his T-shirt, had a yellow T-shirt on, 155 00:10:33,965 --> 00:10:39,551 and he sort of tumbled forward, and after that everybody sort of just tumbled in behind him. 156 00:10:41,931 --> 00:10:44,172 And we just directed them down the slide. 157 00:10:44,862 --> 00:10:46,793 Jump. Jump. 158 00:10:47,689 --> 00:10:49,206 Jump. 159 00:10:49,275 --> 00:10:52,275 In training, they tell you to bring people to the door, 160 00:10:52,344 --> 00:10:54,931 and you tell them to, um, jump. 161 00:10:57,206 --> 00:10:58,758 Jump. 162 00:10:58,827 --> 00:11:01,275 Desperate to get people off the plane quickly, 163 00:11:01,344 --> 00:11:03,586 the purser returns to the jammed door. 164 00:11:03,655 --> 00:11:06,655 After several attempts, he manages to force it open. 165 00:11:09,896 --> 00:11:14,103 The only time I turned around was to make sure that Charlie was following me. 166 00:11:15,172 --> 00:11:16,620 See you out there. 167 00:11:18,137 --> 00:11:20,413 One thing I did see when I looked back 168 00:11:20,482 --> 00:11:25,241 was people going to the front, towards the front of the plane, 169 00:11:25,310 --> 00:11:28,137 where the seats are, and pushing the seats forward, 170 00:11:28,206 --> 00:11:30,103 folding them down as they went along. 171 00:11:30,172 --> 00:11:33,448 So people were trying to rush forward from the back. 172 00:11:33,965 --> 00:11:35,586 The chute was open, 173 00:11:35,655 --> 00:11:39,310 and people were just jumping out straight onto the chute. 174 00:11:39,379 --> 00:11:42,448 As I got to the bottom, didn't look back at all, 175 00:11:42,517 --> 00:11:44,275 just wanting to get off. 176 00:11:44,344 --> 00:11:47,551 Dozens of passengers have made it off the plane, 177 00:11:47,620 --> 00:11:50,000 but there are still many more inside. 178 00:11:50,068 --> 00:11:53,241 It was smouldering, and it was black, thick black smoke. 179 00:11:54,068 --> 00:11:58,275 And Charlie had said that after you'd gone, this black smoke came down, 180 00:11:58,344 --> 00:12:01,482 he said, and everybody was screaming and panicking. 181 00:12:06,000 --> 00:12:08,034 He said people are gonna die in there. 182 00:12:08,103 --> 00:12:09,655 Standby power switch. 183 00:12:09,724 --> 00:12:13,034 Captain Peter Terrington and his first officer Brian Love 184 00:12:13,103 --> 00:12:15,206 are still aboard the burning airplane. 185 00:12:15,896 --> 00:12:18,965 And they still haven't completed the steps required to evacuate. 186 00:12:22,379 --> 00:12:26,689 There was four tons of fuel coming out of that aircraft... wing tank. 187 00:12:26,758 --> 00:12:28,689 Ready to go, Brian? Go, Brian. 188 00:12:28,758 --> 00:12:31,206 I could see quite a lot of flames. 189 00:12:31,965 --> 00:12:35,344 Completing the checklist would put their lives at risk. 190 00:12:37,827 --> 00:12:40,448 We did as many items as we could, 191 00:12:40,517 --> 00:12:43,586 and then we both went out of the flight-deck window. 192 00:12:50,620 --> 00:12:53,413 There are no more passengers at the exits. 193 00:12:53,482 --> 00:12:57,103 So Joanna Toff decides to see if anyone else is left in the cabin. 194 00:12:58,482 --> 00:13:02,206 And the smoke was... you could touch it, it was so thick. 195 00:13:02,275 --> 00:13:04,034 And you could taste... It was awful. 196 00:13:04,103 --> 00:13:05,448 Go! 197 00:13:19,724 --> 00:13:22,551 There was a young girl just a bit further down in the cabin. 198 00:13:23,275 --> 00:13:25,724 But she was really disorientated. 199 00:13:25,793 --> 00:13:27,862 I mean, I suppose we all were, really. 200 00:13:27,931 --> 00:13:30,448 We just didn't have any idea what was going on. 201 00:13:32,275 --> 00:13:35,068 I just brought her down to the slide. She was taken off then. 202 00:13:37,689 --> 00:13:39,931 The fireman was telling me to come on out. 203 00:13:40,620 --> 00:13:44,275 And I'm thinking: Well, I'm not finished, you know, we've not finished yet. 204 00:13:46,931 --> 00:13:49,758 When Toff re-enters the cabin... 205 00:13:49,827 --> 00:13:53,310 ...the thick smoke makes it as hard to see as it is to breathe. 206 00:13:55,620 --> 00:13:58,206 It was really dark and quiet. I've never seen anything like it. 207 00:13:58,275 --> 00:14:01,310 And I could see the light from the door anyway by then, 208 00:14:01,379 --> 00:14:03,137 so I knew where the door was. 209 00:14:03,206 --> 00:14:06,172 The smoke forces Toff to abandon her search. 210 00:14:14,689 --> 00:14:17,241 Just minutes after pulling off the runway, 211 00:14:17,310 --> 00:14:21,034 British Airtours Flight 28 has been consumed by fire. 212 00:14:21,379 --> 00:14:26,517 We got out of the flight deck, which was relatively intact. 213 00:14:27,103 --> 00:14:29,344 And when we turned round, on the ground, 214 00:14:29,413 --> 00:14:33,310 we saw a complete wreck of an aircraft. 215 00:14:33,379 --> 00:14:36,034 And it had happened in a matter of seconds. 216 00:14:37,793 --> 00:14:40,827 It was... uh, dreadful. 217 00:14:44,482 --> 00:14:46,413 Fifty-four people are dead. 218 00:14:47,689 --> 00:14:49,551 Another would die in hospital. 219 00:15:01,103 --> 00:15:03,310 There was nothing wrong, really, with us, 220 00:15:03,379 --> 00:15:05,758 we thought; nothing physical wrong with us. 221 00:15:05,827 --> 00:15:09,724 But our lives changed, you know, just in those few hours. 222 00:15:22,241 --> 00:15:25,827 I couldn't breathe. I was virtually out the door and I couldn't breathe then. 223 00:15:25,896 --> 00:15:27,517 The smoke was coming in, 224 00:15:27,586 --> 00:15:30,793 and everybody just stood up and ran... ran out. 225 00:15:30,862 --> 00:15:33,551 It was just a mad panic getting out. 226 00:15:33,620 --> 00:15:37,620 When the smoke came, you just couldn't see anything at all, couldn't see anybody. 227 00:15:40,379 --> 00:15:42,724 It takes 125 firefighters 228 00:15:42,793 --> 00:15:45,068 more than two hours to put out the fire. 229 00:15:48,827 --> 00:15:51,793 News of the disaster soon spreads around the world. 230 00:15:52,655 --> 00:15:56,793 British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher flies to Manchester to visit the scene. 231 00:15:57,896 --> 00:16:01,344 When we get a terrible air crash of this kind, 232 00:16:01,413 --> 00:16:02,931 everyone is appalled and shocked. 233 00:16:03,000 --> 00:16:06,689 Every single aspect of this accident will be thoroughly investigated. 234 00:16:06,758 --> 00:16:08,448 It has to be. 235 00:16:09,655 --> 00:16:13,275 This is the fourth major commercial air disaster of the year. 236 00:16:13,862 --> 00:16:18,586 In June of 1985, an Air India jet exploded over the Atlantic Ocean. 237 00:16:21,586 --> 00:16:23,931 329 people were killed. 238 00:16:25,137 --> 00:16:27,827 Weeks later, 137 people died 239 00:16:27,896 --> 00:16:32,000 when a Delta Airlines flight crashed at Dallas-Forth Worth Airport. 240 00:16:34,586 --> 00:16:37,586 And just 10 days before the Manchester crash, 241 00:16:37,655 --> 00:16:40,448 the deadliest single-aircraft accident in history. 242 00:16:41,517 --> 00:16:43,896 Japan Airlines Flight 123, 243 00:16:43,965 --> 00:16:45,551 a fully loaded 747, 244 00:16:45,620 --> 00:16:47,793 slammed into a mountain, 245 00:16:47,862 --> 00:16:49,827 killing 520 people. 246 00:16:55,103 --> 00:17:00,000 British Airtours Flight 28 adds 55 new victims to the list of casualties. 247 00:17:01,137 --> 00:17:04,862 1985 in now the deadliest year in the history of commercial aviation. 248 00:17:05,620 --> 00:17:07,931 The flying public is getting nervous. 249 00:17:12,965 --> 00:17:16,655 Britain's Air Accidents Investigation Branch sends a team to Manchester 250 00:17:16,724 --> 00:17:19,310 to unravel the events that led to the catastrophe. 251 00:17:20,482 --> 00:17:22,137 Among them, Stephen Moss. 252 00:17:23,758 --> 00:17:25,586 He'll be inspecting the plane's engines. 253 00:17:26,586 --> 00:17:28,448 This should not really have happened. 254 00:17:28,517 --> 00:17:30,517 The aircraft didn't even get airborne, 255 00:17:30,586 --> 00:17:33,000 it didn't run off the runway, 256 00:17:33,068 --> 00:17:35,517 and yet still, 55 people were killed. 257 00:17:35,586 --> 00:17:38,310 Chris Protheroe is also on the team. 258 00:17:39,827 --> 00:17:41,517 His focus is on the fire. 259 00:17:44,344 --> 00:17:47,206 We were aware, from initial reports, 260 00:17:47,275 --> 00:17:50,862 that the fire had entered the aircraft very rapidly 261 00:17:50,931 --> 00:17:52,931 as the aircraft came to a halt, 262 00:17:53,000 --> 00:17:56,896 and that, um, was a focus... for me. 263 00:17:56,965 --> 00:17:59,793 It doesn't take too long for Stephen Moss to figure out 264 00:17:59,862 --> 00:18:01,482 where the trouble started. 265 00:18:03,413 --> 00:18:06,551 He sees damage to the plane that was not caused by fire. 266 00:18:08,517 --> 00:18:12,620 The first thing we noticed clearly was the hole in the underside of the wing. 267 00:18:16,310 --> 00:18:19,896 And right next to it was a gaping hole in the side of the engine. 268 00:18:19,965 --> 00:18:23,034 Seems that one led to the other. 269 00:18:30,965 --> 00:18:34,137 To get a plane loaded with passengers off the ground, 270 00:18:34,206 --> 00:18:36,310 you need to generate massive thrust. 271 00:18:38,310 --> 00:18:41,551 That power is created when air travels through the front of the engine 272 00:18:41,620 --> 00:18:43,620 to a series of compressor fans. 273 00:18:44,241 --> 00:18:45,827 It's then ignited, 274 00:18:45,896 --> 00:18:48,620 and the exhaust pushes the plane forward. 275 00:18:50,862 --> 00:18:53,068 Something had clearly gone very wrong 276 00:18:53,137 --> 00:18:55,000 with Flight 28's left engine. 277 00:19:01,482 --> 00:19:05,827 Investigators look for clues on the runway and in the cabin, 278 00:19:05,896 --> 00:19:08,827 hoping to discover why so many people died. 279 00:19:14,344 --> 00:19:16,827 Entering the cabin for the first time, 280 00:19:16,896 --> 00:19:19,896 there was a... as with all aircraft fires, 281 00:19:19,965 --> 00:19:22,896 there's an overwhelming and pungent smell: 282 00:19:23,965 --> 00:19:26,000 Burning plastic, burnt fuel. 283 00:19:27,379 --> 00:19:29,655 Burning material had dropped down onto seats, 284 00:19:29,724 --> 00:19:32,758 so the aisles were filled up with... 285 00:19:32,827 --> 00:19:35,000 with the remains of overhead lockers. 286 00:19:36,310 --> 00:19:38,103 A scene of... 287 00:19:38,172 --> 00:19:40,206 of devastation. 288 00:19:42,275 --> 00:19:44,758 The damage in the cabin is revealing. 289 00:19:44,827 --> 00:19:47,068 It's almost completely charred up high... 290 00:19:48,689 --> 00:19:50,896 ...but is relatively intact down low. 291 00:19:53,724 --> 00:19:57,275 It was clear there had not been a flashover in this particular case. 292 00:19:59,517 --> 00:20:02,586 A flashover occurs when the gasses in an enclosed space 293 00:20:02,655 --> 00:20:04,724 become so hot that they ignite, 294 00:20:04,793 --> 00:20:06,793 incinerating everything around them. 295 00:20:12,275 --> 00:20:15,206 The way Flight 28's cabin is charred 296 00:20:15,275 --> 00:20:17,965 tells Protheroe about the nature of the fire. 297 00:20:19,068 --> 00:20:20,931 Many of the seat squab cushions, 298 00:20:21,000 --> 00:20:24,931 even things like... the emergency evacuation cards, 299 00:20:25,000 --> 00:20:27,793 which are just plastic-laminated cards, 300 00:20:27,862 --> 00:20:30,241 were pretty much undamaged. 301 00:20:30,310 --> 00:20:32,965 You could've wiped them off and put them on another aircraft, 302 00:20:33,034 --> 00:20:35,172 and nobody would've known they'd been in this accident. 303 00:20:35,241 --> 00:20:37,655 Whereas at the upper levels in the fuselage, 304 00:20:37,724 --> 00:20:39,482 there was a great deal of heat damage, 305 00:20:39,551 --> 00:20:42,034 and this is not a characteristic of a flashover. 306 00:20:45,758 --> 00:20:48,482 The fire in the cabin had been severe, 307 00:20:48,551 --> 00:20:50,724 but should not have been catastrophic. 308 00:20:51,862 --> 00:20:54,689 This leaves investigators with two questions: 309 00:20:54,758 --> 00:20:58,034 Why did so many people die, 310 00:20:58,103 --> 00:20:59,862 and what caused the fire? 311 00:21:03,931 --> 00:21:05,896 The answer to the second question 312 00:21:05,965 --> 00:21:08,482 may be outside the plane, lying on the runway. 313 00:21:09,517 --> 00:21:13,896 Investigators find a large piece of dome-shaped metal along the plane's path. 314 00:21:18,344 --> 00:21:22,000 Stephen Moss can see it's from a piece of the engine called a combustor can. 315 00:21:27,310 --> 00:21:29,586 It looked like there'd been a separation of the can 316 00:21:29,655 --> 00:21:31,586 from the front end, from the back end. 317 00:21:32,896 --> 00:21:35,965 The combustion chamber of the 737's jet engines 318 00:21:36,034 --> 00:21:38,206 contains nine combustor cans. 319 00:21:39,137 --> 00:21:42,068 It's where fuel and air are mixed and ignited, 320 00:21:42,137 --> 00:21:44,793 so each can needs to withstand intense heat. 321 00:21:48,620 --> 00:21:54,103 Moss suspects the fractured can somehow blew apart and destroyed the plane's left engine. 322 00:21:54,965 --> 00:21:58,482 It had struck an under-wing fuel-tank access panel 323 00:21:58,551 --> 00:22:00,655 and put a sizeable hole in that, 324 00:22:00,724 --> 00:22:03,758 which directly led to the release of a vast quantity of fuel. 325 00:22:05,931 --> 00:22:09,586 Proving the piece of the combustion can penetrated the wing is easy. 326 00:22:10,689 --> 00:22:13,068 It fits neatly into the hole in the wing. 327 00:22:14,517 --> 00:22:17,827 This was clearly, if you like, the root cause of the accident. 328 00:22:18,551 --> 00:22:22,068 The engine on the plane is a Pratt and Whitney JT-8D. 329 00:22:22,137 --> 00:22:24,310 For Moss, that's of grave concern. 330 00:22:25,482 --> 00:22:29,413 At the time, it was probably the most widely used jet engine 331 00:22:29,482 --> 00:22:32,103 on commercial air transport in the world. 332 00:22:32,172 --> 00:22:37,344 And it was obviously pretty urgent that we try and find the cause of this one 333 00:22:37,413 --> 00:22:40,482 in order to prevent other aircraft having the same problem. 334 00:22:43,310 --> 00:22:46,551 There are tens of thousands of combustor cans in service 335 00:22:46,620 --> 00:22:48,172 around the world. 336 00:22:48,241 --> 00:22:50,448 One of them erupted in Manchester. 337 00:22:53,620 --> 00:22:57,103 Stephen Moss needs to find out why it failed... 338 00:22:58,413 --> 00:22:59,931 ...and fast. 339 00:23:07,034 --> 00:23:09,206 Investigators looking into the deadly fire 340 00:23:09,275 --> 00:23:11,793 on board British Airtours Flight 28 341 00:23:11,862 --> 00:23:13,965 study the plane's maintenance log. 342 00:23:14,689 --> 00:23:19,068 They discover the combustor can that ruptured had previously been repaired. 343 00:23:20,620 --> 00:23:23,862 We needed to look at that repair and, uh, 344 00:23:23,931 --> 00:23:25,689 and how effective it was. 345 00:23:28,068 --> 00:23:31,620 During a routine inspection a year and a half earlier, 346 00:23:31,689 --> 00:23:35,482 mechanics had found small cracks in some of the combustor cans. 347 00:23:44,241 --> 00:23:48,586 It was certainly not uncommon to find, uh, fatigue cracks, 348 00:23:48,655 --> 00:23:51,413 um, in the... in the cans. 349 00:23:51,482 --> 00:23:54,344 They're operating in a high-temperature environment. 350 00:23:56,586 --> 00:24:01,000 The manuals give various schemes for repairing these cracks. 351 00:24:01,068 --> 00:24:04,137 Investigators find mechanics repaired the cracks 352 00:24:04,206 --> 00:24:08,172 according to a procedure laid out in the engine-repair manual. 353 00:24:08,241 --> 00:24:10,241 They welded them closed. 354 00:24:10,310 --> 00:24:13,758 But the crack on can was unusually long. 355 00:24:15,793 --> 00:24:17,551 The overhaul manual, um, 356 00:24:17,620 --> 00:24:21,724 did not give any limit on the length of crack that could be repaired, 357 00:24:21,793 --> 00:24:25,275 and it was a longer crack than had been experienced before; 358 00:24:25,344 --> 00:24:27,758 it was still repaired. 359 00:24:29,931 --> 00:24:33,000 After the repaired cans were put back in the engine, 360 00:24:33,068 --> 00:24:37,448 mechanics had no way of knowing the weld didn't effectively seal the crack. 361 00:24:39,965 --> 00:24:42,068 That's because the cans can't be inspected 362 00:24:42,137 --> 00:24:44,068 while the engine is on the plane. 363 00:24:46,103 --> 00:24:50,034 Since the repair, there were 11 reports of slow acceleration 364 00:24:50,103 --> 00:24:52,068 from the engine that exploded in Manchester. 365 00:24:54,965 --> 00:24:58,275 A damaged combustor can could've been a reason for the problem. 366 00:25:00,379 --> 00:25:03,344 But troubleshooting guides available to mechanics in Manchester 367 00:25:03,413 --> 00:25:05,862 didn't list that as a potential cause. 368 00:25:06,344 --> 00:25:11,310 Instead, Pratt and Whitney offered other ways to fix the acceleration problem. 369 00:25:12,896 --> 00:25:16,586 It didn't seem to ring any great alarm bells with them, if you like. 370 00:25:16,655 --> 00:25:18,931 They'd seen it before, 371 00:25:19,000 --> 00:25:22,448 and it had never turned out to be anything serious. 372 00:25:24,551 --> 00:25:27,862 So mechanics in Manchester made minor adjustments 373 00:25:27,931 --> 00:25:31,310 to fix the plane's idle speed and kept the plane in operation. 374 00:25:34,448 --> 00:25:38,862 Cockpit voice recordings reveal that the crew of Flight 28 was aware 375 00:25:38,931 --> 00:25:41,482 there was a problem with slow acceleration. 376 00:25:41,551 --> 00:25:45,034 Slow acceleration on the day before yesterday. 377 00:25:45,103 --> 00:25:48,172 - I was on the flight, yes, sir. - And they signed off on it. 378 00:25:48,241 --> 00:25:51,413 But the log entry led Captain Terrington to believe 379 00:25:51,482 --> 00:25:53,206 that the problem had been fixed. 380 00:25:54,793 --> 00:25:56,965 A comment in the tech log, 381 00:25:57,034 --> 00:26:00,827 uh, for... for the flight before the last one... 382 00:26:01,724 --> 00:26:04,206 ...that the engine was slow in accelerating. 383 00:26:04,275 --> 00:26:06,551 It wasn't apparent as a serious problem. 384 00:26:07,275 --> 00:26:09,241 Because the engineers had done some work, 385 00:26:09,310 --> 00:26:13,586 and the aircraft had been flying the previous day with no problems. 386 00:26:13,655 --> 00:26:17,034 The idle-speed adjustments didn't fix the real problem: 387 00:26:17,862 --> 00:26:19,448 The cracked combustor can. 388 00:26:20,551 --> 00:26:23,206 And it reached the breaking point on Flight 28. 389 00:26:26,137 --> 00:26:28,827 Stopping. 28 Mike, we are abandoning takeoff. 390 00:26:30,896 --> 00:26:32,655 Evacuate! Evacuate! 391 00:26:32,724 --> 00:26:34,517 Please stay calm and don't panic. 392 00:26:37,310 --> 00:26:39,862 If the airline had, uh, inspected the cans, 393 00:26:39,931 --> 00:26:42,827 I think there is no doubt they would've seen a problem. 394 00:26:46,827 --> 00:26:50,206 Investigators now know the origins of the Manchester disaster. 395 00:26:52,103 --> 00:26:55,655 The welded crack in combustor can 396 00:26:55,724 --> 00:26:58,068 as Flight 28 sped down the runway. 397 00:26:58,758 --> 00:27:01,241 The front of the can was ejected from the engine 398 00:27:01,310 --> 00:27:04,482 and put a hole in the underside of the left wing. 399 00:27:04,551 --> 00:27:09,241 That led to a huge fuel leak onto the damaged engine, which caused the fire. 400 00:27:10,482 --> 00:27:12,344 Engine fires are not uncommon. 401 00:27:13,103 --> 00:27:18,068 The body of a 737 is insulated with fire-retardant material to protect the cabin. 402 00:27:19,620 --> 00:27:22,724 Investigators still don't understand how a fire outside the plane 403 00:27:22,793 --> 00:27:25,413 spread into the cabin as quickly as it did. 404 00:27:26,655 --> 00:27:29,517 Fire inspector Chris Protheroe finds part of the answer 405 00:27:29,586 --> 00:27:33,068 from viewing photographs of the plane as it sped down the runway. 406 00:27:33,655 --> 00:27:35,655 It was clear from these photographs 407 00:27:35,724 --> 00:27:40,413 there was a very dynamic phase to the fire whilst the aircraft was at speed on the runway, 408 00:27:40,482 --> 00:27:43,172 which produced this energetic, 409 00:27:43,241 --> 00:27:47,103 turbulent, sort of blow-torching type of fire, visually anyway, 410 00:27:47,172 --> 00:27:49,310 trailing behind the aircraft. 411 00:27:51,206 --> 00:27:55,103 A press photo from the day of the crash leads Protheroe to a new theory. 412 00:27:56,896 --> 00:28:00,482 The photographs of the aircraft that appeared in the press 413 00:28:00,551 --> 00:28:03,655 showed the left thrust reverser deployed. 414 00:28:05,724 --> 00:28:09,310 The general impression that one got visually from that photograph 415 00:28:09,379 --> 00:28:12,758 was that the thrust reversers had effectively blow-torched fire 416 00:28:12,827 --> 00:28:14,482 against the side of the fuselage. 417 00:28:14,551 --> 00:28:16,689 And that, if you like... 418 00:28:17,517 --> 00:28:21,517 ...was the explanation as to why the fire had penetrated so quickly. 419 00:28:22,103 --> 00:28:25,482 That photograph and the implications of it, actually, 420 00:28:25,551 --> 00:28:28,448 um... therefore loomed quite large. 421 00:28:28,517 --> 00:28:30,379 Stop! 422 00:28:30,448 --> 00:28:33,827 There are several ways to bring a speeding jetliner to a halt. 423 00:28:33,896 --> 00:28:35,655 One is with the brakes. 424 00:28:35,724 --> 00:28:37,172 Don't hammer the brakes. 425 00:28:38,620 --> 00:28:41,551 Another is with the engine's thrust reversers. 426 00:28:41,620 --> 00:28:45,620 Thrust reversers redirect the exhaust from the jet engine forwards. 427 00:28:45,689 --> 00:28:47,965 This helps slow the plane down. 428 00:28:48,551 --> 00:28:53,862 It looked as though the thrust reversers had simply blown this big fire 429 00:28:53,931 --> 00:28:55,758 on the left of the aircraft against the... 430 00:28:55,827 --> 00:28:58,655 directly onto the side of the aircraft, 431 00:28:58,724 --> 00:29:00,724 directly onto the rear fuselage. 432 00:29:02,310 --> 00:29:06,172 That would explain why the fire destroyed the cabin so quickly. 433 00:29:06,241 --> 00:29:09,758 It now seems possible that Captain Terrington made the fire worse 434 00:29:09,827 --> 00:29:12,000 by trying to slow his plane down. 435 00:29:13,931 --> 00:29:16,586 But Protheroe has two good reasons to doubt his theory. 436 00:29:16,655 --> 00:29:20,724 One is the location where charring from the burning exhaust gas, 437 00:29:20,793 --> 00:29:23,000 or efflux, was found. 438 00:29:29,172 --> 00:29:32,034 The efflux impinges on the fuselage further up, 439 00:29:32,103 --> 00:29:35,965 closer to the roof... the crown skins of the aircraft. 440 00:29:36,034 --> 00:29:37,551 So actually... 441 00:29:37,620 --> 00:29:42,034 the penetration that we had low down did not fit with that. 442 00:29:43,068 --> 00:29:44,758 And the other reason is: 443 00:29:44,827 --> 00:29:47,034 By the time the thrust reversers were deployed, 444 00:29:47,103 --> 00:29:49,413 the left engine had already exploded. 445 00:29:53,310 --> 00:29:57,620 But to act as a blowtorch, the engine would've needed considerable exhaust. 446 00:30:00,103 --> 00:30:04,586 We did calculations to confirm that the residual thrust from that engine 447 00:30:04,655 --> 00:30:08,724 would not have had the energy to have this effect. 448 00:30:08,793 --> 00:30:10,689 That confirmed that, uh, 449 00:30:10,758 --> 00:30:15,517 the thrust reversers couldn't actually have played any role, 450 00:30:15,586 --> 00:30:20,068 or significant role anyway, in the fire's severity. 451 00:30:22,275 --> 00:30:24,551 Clearly, something other than the thrusters 452 00:30:24,620 --> 00:30:27,034 had caused the fire to spread so quickly. 453 00:30:27,103 --> 00:30:29,068 Protheroe looks more closely at the data. 454 00:30:29,965 --> 00:30:34,344 After examining weather reports from the day of the accident, he finds the answer. 455 00:30:40,620 --> 00:30:44,793 The wind was the main factor that determined the severity of the fire, 456 00:30:44,862 --> 00:30:47,931 in terms of its attack on the outside of the aircraft, 457 00:30:48,000 --> 00:30:50,724 how rapidly it penetrated the aircraft, 458 00:30:50,793 --> 00:30:53,724 and it also affected the conditions inside the cabin. 459 00:30:54,344 --> 00:30:56,448 Believing he had blown a tire, 460 00:30:56,517 --> 00:30:58,689 Captain Terrington made a fateful decision. 461 00:30:58,758 --> 00:31:01,655 Stopping. 28 Mike, we are abandoning takeoff. 462 00:31:01,724 --> 00:31:03,655 Well, when we heard the thud, 463 00:31:03,724 --> 00:31:05,827 then we closed the throttles. 464 00:31:05,896 --> 00:31:09,551 It was my assumption that we were going to turn off the runway, 465 00:31:09,620 --> 00:31:13,758 clear the runway, ask Air Traffic for an engineer to come out and check the tires. 466 00:31:13,827 --> 00:31:17,482 Like a highway, an airport runway has a series of exits. 467 00:31:18,758 --> 00:31:21,965 Captain Terrington chose one called Link Delta. 468 00:31:23,137 --> 00:31:26,068 We got a fire on 469 00:31:26,896 --> 00:31:30,931 When we got the additional information of a fire warning, 470 00:31:31,000 --> 00:31:35,620 the brain was already programmed to carry out the, uh... 471 00:31:35,689 --> 00:31:37,172 the stop. 472 00:31:39,586 --> 00:31:41,689 The crew had been aware that they had a fire, 473 00:31:41,758 --> 00:31:43,793 but didn't really appreciate at the time 474 00:31:43,862 --> 00:31:46,137 the nature of the fire, the severity of the fire. 475 00:31:46,206 --> 00:31:48,896 So they had turned off the runway. 476 00:31:49,965 --> 00:31:53,793 Captain Terrington turned his plane to the right and brought it to a stop. 477 00:31:55,827 --> 00:31:59,482 He couldn't have realized that doing so would make the problem far worse. 478 00:32:00,793 --> 00:32:02,482 There was a crosswind, 479 00:32:02,551 --> 00:32:06,000 a slight crosswind from the left side of the aircraft, 480 00:32:06,068 --> 00:32:10,172 that was carrying the fire that was burning from the fuel 481 00:32:10,241 --> 00:32:12,379 that was pooled underneath the left wing. 482 00:32:12,448 --> 00:32:15,862 It carried that fire aft, rearwards, 483 00:32:15,931 --> 00:32:20,517 and to over and under the rear fuselage, 484 00:32:20,586 --> 00:32:23,000 in between the wing and the tail plane. 485 00:32:23,068 --> 00:32:26,206 The wind wrapped the fire around the back of the plane... 486 00:32:26,275 --> 00:32:29,275 ...and into the cabin. 487 00:32:30,551 --> 00:32:32,000 If there'd been no wind at all, 488 00:32:32,068 --> 00:32:35,586 I think the situation would've been very much more benign. 489 00:32:38,448 --> 00:32:42,206 Investigators have discovered how the fire started... 490 00:32:42,275 --> 00:32:45,068 and the conditions that caused it to penetrate the cabin. 491 00:32:47,586 --> 00:32:50,827 Now investigator Ed Trimble must solve the biggest mystery 492 00:32:50,896 --> 00:32:52,793 surrounding the Manchester accident. 493 00:32:54,379 --> 00:32:57,793 Here we had an aircraft which had aborted the takeoff... 494 00:32:58,689 --> 00:33:00,896 ...for good reason, had, uh... 495 00:33:01,896 --> 00:33:05,068 ...taxied off and stopped in a taxiway... 496 00:33:06,275 --> 00:33:08,862 ...in an expeditious manner, and yet... 497 00:33:10,103 --> 00:33:12,103 ...55 people had lost their lives. 498 00:33:12,172 --> 00:33:15,206 So there was a big question as to... 499 00:33:15,275 --> 00:33:17,517 precisely why that had occurred. 500 00:33:20,034 --> 00:33:24,586 Investigators learn that most of the dead were not found 501 00:33:24,655 --> 00:33:27,172 in the worst-burned parts of the plane. 502 00:33:29,344 --> 00:33:33,034 Autopsies will point to the real killer on Flight 28. 503 00:33:38,965 --> 00:33:42,137 Of the 54 people who died in the cabin, 504 00:33:42,206 --> 00:33:44,724 only six had suffered serious burns. 505 00:33:45,413 --> 00:33:47,896 All the rest died from smoke inhalation. 506 00:33:50,000 --> 00:33:52,827 It seems the smoke in the cabin was particularly lethal. 507 00:33:53,827 --> 00:33:56,724 Survivors tell investigators that the smoke was unbearable. 508 00:33:56,793 --> 00:34:00,137 The smoke was really black and... and it was... 509 00:34:00,206 --> 00:34:02,413 it was almost touching you, 510 00:34:02,482 --> 00:34:05,517 it was... it was... it was really weird. 511 00:34:05,586 --> 00:34:08,448 And they said the effect of that was shocking. 512 00:34:08,517 --> 00:34:10,862 That immediately you took one breath of the smoke, 513 00:34:10,931 --> 00:34:13,310 you began to feel debilitated 514 00:34:13,379 --> 00:34:17,620 and you knew that if you took another breath or two, you weren't going to make it. 515 00:34:21,586 --> 00:34:23,793 At the time of the Manchester accident, 516 00:34:23,862 --> 00:34:28,586 the effects of fire on an airplane had been well studied and understood. 517 00:34:28,655 --> 00:34:30,724 But the effects of smoke were not. 518 00:34:34,482 --> 00:34:37,551 To figure out what made the smoke so toxic, 519 00:34:37,620 --> 00:34:41,206 Trimble decides to recreate the fire that burned on Flight 28. 520 00:34:44,517 --> 00:34:47,724 We were trying to model not only the gases which were produced, 521 00:34:47,793 --> 00:34:51,103 but also the kind of threat levels which were produced. 522 00:34:51,172 --> 00:34:53,310 The smoke that filled the plane was from materials 523 00:34:53,379 --> 00:34:55,482 burning inside the cabin. 524 00:34:55,931 --> 00:34:57,965 The foam in the seats, 525 00:34:58,034 --> 00:35:01,827 the wool in the carpets and the plastic overhead bins 526 00:35:01,896 --> 00:35:03,724 all release poisonous fumes. 527 00:35:04,482 --> 00:35:07,482 Those conditions are recreated by burning those same materials. 528 00:35:09,896 --> 00:35:13,275 Trimble discovers the passengers on Flight 28 inhaled smoke 529 00:35:13,344 --> 00:35:16,344 that contained a deadly blend of poisonous gases... 530 00:35:17,965 --> 00:35:22,482 ...including high levels of carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide. 531 00:35:25,689 --> 00:35:28,413 Now he desperately needs to find out if there's any way 532 00:35:28,482 --> 00:35:31,413 to protect airline passengers from that kind of smoke. 533 00:35:34,275 --> 00:35:37,586 It would seem to me... pretty clear... 534 00:35:37,655 --> 00:35:41,758 that unless we could protect people's respiratory systems 535 00:35:41,827 --> 00:35:46,000 from the assault from such combustion gases... 536 00:35:47,068 --> 00:35:49,931 ...there was little that we could do to improve 537 00:35:50,000 --> 00:35:53,068 survival chances from aircraft fires. 538 00:35:57,586 --> 00:35:59,896 Over the course of five weeks, 539 00:35:59,965 --> 00:36:02,448 investigators run dozens of tests, 540 00:36:02,517 --> 00:36:04,517 experimenting with different filters. 541 00:36:12,724 --> 00:36:16,000 They burn nearly a quarter ton of material 542 00:36:16,068 --> 00:36:18,413 to create the necessary smoke. 543 00:36:18,482 --> 00:36:20,482 Their dramatic conclusion: 544 00:36:20,551 --> 00:36:23,551 It may have been possible to save passengers' lives. 545 00:36:24,758 --> 00:36:29,482 There was not the slightest doubt in my mind that in these situations, 546 00:36:29,551 --> 00:36:34,517 in an aircraft cabin, if it is being assaulted by combustion gases... 547 00:36:36,379 --> 00:36:40,000 ...your chances of survival are vastly improved 548 00:36:40,068 --> 00:36:43,482 if you have, um... smoke-hood protection. 549 00:36:47,724 --> 00:36:52,000 British Airtours Flight 28 had only enough smoke hoods for the crew. 550 00:36:52,793 --> 00:36:54,310 They were never used. 551 00:36:58,413 --> 00:37:02,068 Trimble's research indicates that smoke hoods for passengers could've saved lives. 552 00:37:03,482 --> 00:37:05,344 There were hoods available, 553 00:37:05,413 --> 00:37:07,896 both of the filter type and the breathable gas type, 554 00:37:07,965 --> 00:37:11,655 which can provide a very high level of protection to people 555 00:37:11,724 --> 00:37:13,517 in these circumstances. 556 00:37:18,172 --> 00:37:21,724 Many of the passengers on Flight 28 would've survived 557 00:37:21,793 --> 00:37:24,241 with a few more minutes of breathing time. 558 00:37:28,206 --> 00:37:31,241 It was... it was in a blink of an eye, you know, from... 559 00:37:32,724 --> 00:37:35,896 ...from the time, you know, we stopped on the runway. 560 00:37:35,965 --> 00:37:40,310 You know, just within a few minutes, it was all over, really. 561 00:37:42,586 --> 00:37:47,931 A full Boeing 737 is designed to be evacuated in less than two minutes. 562 00:37:48,000 --> 00:37:50,206 So even without additional time, 563 00:37:50,275 --> 00:37:53,931 more of the passengers on Flight 28 should've been able to get off. 564 00:37:57,655 --> 00:38:01,000 To discover why so many people never made it off the plane, 565 00:38:01,068 --> 00:38:04,758 investigators turn to an unlikely source for the answer. 566 00:38:10,620 --> 00:38:12,896 Jump, jump, jump! 567 00:38:12,965 --> 00:38:16,896 By law, airplane manufacturers must prove their planes 568 00:38:16,965 --> 00:38:19,310 can be evacuated quickly and safely. 569 00:38:20,517 --> 00:38:23,310 When the 737 was introduced in the UK, 570 00:38:23,379 --> 00:38:26,689 Boeing demonstrated that 130 people could get off the plane 571 00:38:26,758 --> 00:38:28,793 in just 75 seconds. 572 00:38:28,862 --> 00:38:33,172 All public-transport aircraft are certificated to the same criteria, 573 00:38:33,241 --> 00:38:37,000 and that is that the total complement of passengers 574 00:38:37,068 --> 00:38:41,310 must be capable of evacuating from the aircraft 575 00:38:41,379 --> 00:38:44,103 using half the exits in the aircraft - 576 00:38:44,172 --> 00:38:46,103 it's generally one side or the other - 577 00:38:46,172 --> 00:38:48,586 within a maximum of 90 seconds. 578 00:38:49,482 --> 00:38:52,965 But 90 seconds after Flight 28 came to a stop, 579 00:38:53,034 --> 00:38:55,344 most of the passengers were still on board. 580 00:39:00,000 --> 00:39:04,137 The reason why the evacuation in Manchester wasn't, uh... 581 00:39:04,206 --> 00:39:06,551 achieved in 90 seconds 582 00:39:06,620 --> 00:39:10,206 is because the conditions in a real fire evacuation 583 00:39:10,275 --> 00:39:13,034 are completely different from the certification conditions. 584 00:39:13,896 --> 00:39:17,586 The certification evacuation is conducted in clear conditions, 585 00:39:17,655 --> 00:39:21,517 with no smoke that reduces vision and overwhelms passengers. 586 00:39:24,275 --> 00:39:26,310 Within minutes of coming to a stop, 587 00:39:26,379 --> 00:39:29,034 Flight 28 filled with thick, black smoke. 588 00:39:30,310 --> 00:39:34,758 A soon as the smoke began to spill into the rear... 589 00:39:34,827 --> 00:39:37,517 cabin and then flow forwards... 590 00:39:39,206 --> 00:39:43,241 ...essentially that induced immediate panic in those... 591 00:39:43,310 --> 00:39:46,206 who were so affected by the smoke, because their respiration... 592 00:39:46,275 --> 00:39:47,965 I mean, the typical comment was: 593 00:39:48,034 --> 00:39:52,482 "I took one breath of smoke and I felt as though my lungs were solidifying." 594 00:39:52,551 --> 00:39:55,620 You can imagine, under these conditions, that people... 595 00:39:55,689 --> 00:39:58,448 have got to get away from the smoke. 596 00:39:58,517 --> 00:40:00,620 And the people did this 597 00:40:00,689 --> 00:40:03,586 by basically clamouring over the seats and other people in front of them. 598 00:40:04,931 --> 00:40:06,586 In less than five minutes, 599 00:40:06,655 --> 00:40:09,724 what should've been a survivable accident turned deadly. 600 00:40:12,931 --> 00:40:15,103 To prevent future tragedies, 601 00:40:15,172 --> 00:40:19,068 Britain's Civil Aviation Authority decides to learn more about people. 602 00:40:19,482 --> 00:40:22,517 Helen Muir is a psychologist and a leading expert 603 00:40:22,586 --> 00:40:25,551 on how airplane design can influence survival. 604 00:40:27,206 --> 00:40:30,758 She's asked to study the behaviour of passengers on Flight 28 605 00:40:30,827 --> 00:40:32,827 to figure out why so many died. 606 00:40:36,862 --> 00:40:40,137 What we had to learn to do was to design the aircraft interior 607 00:40:40,206 --> 00:40:42,655 so even if we had what we might say 608 00:40:42,724 --> 00:40:46,034 was dysfunctional behaviour in totality, 609 00:40:46,103 --> 00:40:48,344 we could accommodate the needs of individuals 610 00:40:48,413 --> 00:40:50,655 in their desperate rush to get out. 611 00:40:52,586 --> 00:40:56,000 Muir configures a cabin to duplicate Flight 28 612 00:40:56,068 --> 00:40:58,241 and fills it with volunteers. 613 00:40:58,310 --> 00:41:01,586 Then, to have them act as though the plane's on fire, 614 00:41:01,655 --> 00:41:04,000 she offers money to the first ones off. 615 00:41:04,827 --> 00:41:07,724 And that produced behaviour that was quite unbelievable. 616 00:41:07,793 --> 00:41:12,206 People went over seats, they went round past each other, all sorts of things. 617 00:41:12,275 --> 00:41:17,344 And indeed, when survivors from the actual Manchester accident came and saw the videos, 618 00:41:17,413 --> 00:41:19,965 they said, "Yeah, that's how it was." 619 00:41:30,758 --> 00:41:34,068 The evacuation of Flight 28 was slowed by the fact 620 00:41:34,137 --> 00:41:36,310 that passengers became jammed in the bulkhead opening 621 00:41:36,379 --> 00:41:38,586 separating the main cabin from the galley. 622 00:41:38,655 --> 00:41:41,000 Jump down the slide. 623 00:41:43,034 --> 00:41:45,551 Investigators discover the logjam was created 624 00:41:45,620 --> 00:41:47,896 by the design of the Boeing 737. 625 00:41:48,655 --> 00:41:51,620 The bulkhead opening was 22.5 inches wide, 626 00:41:51,689 --> 00:41:54,068 just enough for one person to fit through. 627 00:41:56,379 --> 00:42:00,758 But what they wanted to know was how much wider would they have to make it 628 00:42:00,827 --> 00:42:03,551 for people not to get stopped and blocked. 629 00:42:03,620 --> 00:42:07,517 We were trying to do as much as we could to recreate the situation 630 00:42:07,586 --> 00:42:10,655 which had happened in Manchester, and then... 631 00:42:10,724 --> 00:42:13,344 to systematically vary the aircraft interior 632 00:42:13,413 --> 00:42:17,310 to see what changes would improve the situation for passengers. 633 00:42:19,172 --> 00:42:22,241 Muir's tests showed the narrow bulkhead opening created bottlenecks 634 00:42:22,310 --> 00:42:24,620 that flight attendants had to constantly clear. 635 00:42:25,551 --> 00:42:29,862 Increasing the width to 30 inches greatly improved the movement of passengers. 636 00:42:35,068 --> 00:42:37,310 But we showed, through repeat testing, 637 00:42:37,379 --> 00:42:41,103 that if you changed the minimum gap from 20 to 30 inches, 638 00:42:41,172 --> 00:42:45,482 you would dramatically improve the speed at which people could get out, 639 00:42:45,551 --> 00:42:49,000 and you'd reduce the likelihood of people falling and slipping and so on. 640 00:42:50,827 --> 00:42:52,931 As a result of Helen Muir's work, 641 00:42:53,000 --> 00:42:58,448 a recommendation was made to increase the space between the bulkhead walls to 30 inches, 642 00:42:59,689 --> 00:43:03,344 ...and introduce strip lighting to help guide passengers to exits 643 00:43:03,413 --> 00:43:05,413 even when they are blinded by smoke. 644 00:43:09,758 --> 00:43:13,793 Muir also found a way to improve cabin safety without redesigning the cabin. 645 00:43:14,724 --> 00:43:16,793 Please sit down. 646 00:43:16,862 --> 00:43:21,655 She conducted research on the behaviour of the cabin crew in emergencies 647 00:43:21,724 --> 00:43:26,448 and found that passengers get off a plane much faster with a highly assertive crew. 648 00:43:26,517 --> 00:43:28,448 Mind your head! 649 00:43:28,517 --> 00:43:31,655 - Come on, this way! - This way! Take it easy. 650 00:43:31,724 --> 00:43:35,275 It's because we don't want people really making their own decisions. 651 00:43:36,827 --> 00:43:41,068 We want people to do exactly what the cabin crew or the procedures state. 652 00:43:41,137 --> 00:43:43,206 And we don't want people hesitating, 653 00:43:43,275 --> 00:43:45,310 particularly at the door. 654 00:43:47,172 --> 00:43:49,758 Helen Muir's research prompted manufacturers 655 00:43:49,827 --> 00:43:52,034 to redesign cabins to make them safer. 656 00:43:52,103 --> 00:43:55,034 But one safety feature remains controversial: 657 00:43:55,103 --> 00:43:57,241 Smoke hoods. 658 00:43:59,275 --> 00:44:03,034 Ed Trimble believes they should be mandatory on all commercial flights. 659 00:44:04,379 --> 00:44:06,655 Without a doubt. Without a doubt. 660 00:44:07,827 --> 00:44:09,793 Helen Muir is less convinced. 661 00:44:11,034 --> 00:44:14,241 She's studied how smoke hoods affect passenger behaviour, 662 00:44:14,310 --> 00:44:18,068 and is worried they would slow down the orderly evacuation of an airplane. 663 00:44:19,448 --> 00:44:22,137 We know you've only got literally... 664 00:44:22,896 --> 00:44:25,655 ...1.5 to 2 minutes for everybody to get out. 665 00:44:25,724 --> 00:44:29,517 What we don't want to have is something which is difficult to put on, 666 00:44:29,586 --> 00:44:32,172 and so it slows people getting down. 667 00:44:32,241 --> 00:44:35,689 The most important lesson of British Airtours Flight 28 668 00:44:35,758 --> 00:44:37,448 is that seconds matter. 669 00:44:37,517 --> 00:44:41,137 It's now universally accepted that it takes 90 seconds 670 00:44:41,206 --> 00:44:44,862 from the first sign of fire before it becomes unsurvivable. 671 00:44:48,620 --> 00:44:51,482 The passengers on Flight 28 lost valuable time 672 00:44:51,551 --> 00:44:53,896 when the starboard-side door jammed. 673 00:44:54,551 --> 00:44:58,896 The investigators determined that the slide mechanism deployed too early, 674 00:44:58,965 --> 00:45:00,586 preventing the door from opening. 675 00:45:01,758 --> 00:45:04,931 There was a flaw that led the slide container's lid to jam 676 00:45:05,000 --> 00:45:07,068 if the door is opened too quickly. 677 00:45:08,413 --> 00:45:10,034 After the Manchester accident, 678 00:45:10,103 --> 00:45:13,137 Boeing quickly redesigned the system so that couldn't happen. 679 00:45:16,620 --> 00:45:20,517 But the recommendations made by the AAIB weren't adopted quickly enough 680 00:45:20,586 --> 00:45:22,586 to save lives six years later. 681 00:45:27,310 --> 00:45:29,241 In 1991, 682 00:45:29,310 --> 00:45:34,344 a Boeing 737 slammed into another plane on the runway in Los Angeles and caught fire. 683 00:45:35,241 --> 00:45:40,724 Many of the 22 people who died were overcome by smoke before they could get out. 684 00:45:42,448 --> 00:45:46,379 But in 2005, the crash of an Air France jet in Toronto 685 00:45:46,448 --> 00:45:50,000 showed how much has changed since the Manchester accident. 686 00:45:53,344 --> 00:45:57,413 All 309 people got off that plane in just 90 seconds. 687 00:45:57,482 --> 00:45:59,000 No one died. 688 00:46:03,413 --> 00:46:06,000 Some major changes to commercial airliners... 689 00:46:07,206 --> 00:46:08,793 Ah! Alright, the door's open! 690 00:46:08,862 --> 00:46:13,103 ...came about because of a flight that never left the ground. 691 00:46:14,862 --> 00:46:16,724 That's the only way I can resolve it, 692 00:46:16,793 --> 00:46:19,586 with the death of 55 of my passengers. 693 00:46:20,724 --> 00:46:22,241 The fact that... 694 00:46:22,862 --> 00:46:24,620 ...flying is now safer. 695 00:46:24,689 --> 00:46:27,827 I can't imagine anybody, you know, 696 00:46:27,896 --> 00:46:30,172 doesn't wish that it hadn't happened. 697 00:46:31,275 --> 00:46:34,689 You know, despite what's been learned and despite... 698 00:46:34,758 --> 00:46:37,275 maybe the subsequent lives that have been changed, you know, 699 00:46:37,344 --> 00:46:39,965 you'd give anything for it not to have happened. 700 00:47:00,000 --> 00:47:02,068 difuze